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DON’T GET BIT: ADDRESSING ICSID’S INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF MOST-
FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Few except gunboat makers mourn the end of gunboat diplomacy.1 Although this 
traditional method of resolving investment disputes is currently obsolete,2 the transformation has 
taken place primarily in the last few decades.  Rather than waiting for customary law3 to provide 
security for foreign direct investment, developed nations found a quicker path, the Bilateral 
 
1 Gunboat diplomacy is diplomacy involving intimidation by threat or use of military force.  
Traditionally, stronger military powers were able to dictate terms to weaker ones.  Here, an 
example is instructive.  In 1853, United States Commodore Perry opened Japan to foreign trade 
after 200 years of isolation.  He did so simply by demonstrating the superiority of American 
naval power.  The increasingly infrequent use of this method to resolve international disputes is 
especially important given the destructive capacity of modern weaponry. 
 
2 Most nations have moved beyond the use of force to protect investments made by their citizens 
in foreign states.  “Modern international economic relations regulated through bilateral or 
multilateral conventions were preceded by what then came to be known as gunboat diplomacy.”  
Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formation of Customary 
International Law, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327, 329 (1994).  “In order to avoid the historical 
difficulties associated with ‘gunboat diplomacy,’ countries have promulgated treaties to promote 
foreign investment and instill confidence in the stability of the investment environment.” Susan 
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2005). 
 
3 Customary law arises when a certain practice between nations becomes widely accepted as 
obligatory and legally binding.  See Bernard Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 336-37.  Because it 
requires the tacit consent of a majority of nations, customary law often develops slowly.  The 
BIT movement is in part an effort to speed up the process of outlining investor rights.  The 
movement gained momentum after World War II because international custom regarding foreign 
investment failed to address modern forms of investment and was often subject to varying 
interpretations.  See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 
68-69 (2005).  
2Investment Treaty (BIT).4 This new type of treaty outlined the terms and conditions for private 
investment by individuals and companies of one state in the territory of another.  Specifically, it 
provided substantive and procedural safeguards for investors whose investments were otherwise 
subject to the whims of the host country. 
 Nevertheless, despite the assurances given in BITs, without a neutral dispute resolution 
mechanism, national interests were still able to affect the security of investments.5 In response to 
the need for independent resolution of investment disputes, the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created.6 Now that ICSID is the preeminent 
arbitral organization dealing with disputes between sovereign states and individual investors, its 
decisions carry significant weight.7
Recently, ICSID arbitration panel decisions have employed conflicting approaches to 
applying Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses in BITs to dispute resolution provisions.8 These 
 
4 “It is this uncertainty relating to the law on state responsibility that has given an impetus to the 
negotiation of bilateral investment treaties.”  Bernard Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 332; see also 
Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 76. 
 
5 The intractability of national interests in investment disputes is demonstrated by the fact that 
the World Bank felt it necessary to create the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes as a neutral arbitration forum. 
 
6 “The key purpose in establishing ICSID was to assure foreign investors of protection under 
international law from unilateral actions of host countries which could jeopardize their 
investments.”  Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2001). 
 
7 “[M]ost BITs can, and do, provide for arbitration under the ICSID Convention.”  David R. 
Sedlak, Comment, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the 
Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 160 (2004) (citing ICSID: Introduction to 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm). 
 
8 See infra notes 133-247 and accompanying text. 
 
3inconsistent decisions threaten to frustrate the purpose of the BIT regime – providing states and 
investors with confidence regarding their respective rights and obligations.9
This article will examine the potential effects and problems associated with this set of 
MFN decisions.  Part II discusses the importance and historical development of international 
investment law and practice.  It pays particular attention to the rise of the BIT and its effect on 
foreign direct investment.  Part III discusses the effect of ICSID on international investment.  
After describing the reasons for creating ICSID, this part explains its structure and emphasizes 
its ever increasing importance.  Part IV discusses ICSID’s divergent approaches toward the 
effect of MFN clauses on dispute resolution provisions in BITs.  Part V addresses the problems 
associated with these inconsistent approaches.  Part VI discusses potential means to remedy the 
conflict.  Part VII concludes the comment. 
II. GETTING BIT 
A. The End of Gunboat Diplomacy and the Rise of Trade Agreements 
When the use of force was the primary means for settling international disputes, stronger 
nations often imposed their will on weaker ones.  Given the abrasive nature of the practice, it is 
not surprising that gunboat diplomacy occasionally resulted in investment-restricting practices.  
Perhaps the most famous such reaction was embodied in the Calvo Clause.10 
Prior to 1914, Latin American countries protested being forced by demonstrations of 
European military power to pay debt.11 On one occasion, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy 
 
9 See infra notes 248-258 and accompanying text. 
 
10 See Bernard Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 329 & n.7. 
 
11 Id. at 329. 
 
4engaged in a joint naval intervention in Venezuela.12 This practice sparked outrage in several 
Latin American countries.13 The outrage ultimately resulted in constitutional and statutory 
provisions, known as the Calvo Clause, that required foreign investors to waive appeal to 
diplomatic protection in favor of seeking redress in local courts under the law of the host state.14 
Understandably, the Calvo Clause chilled foreign investment into South America.15 This chilling 
effect, coupled with changed views regarding the appropriate use of force in international 
relations after World War II, may have accelerated the end of military protection of foreign 
investment. 
After the decline of gunboat diplomacy, the next stage in the evolution of investment 
protection was the bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.16 Although these 
treaties focused primarily on facilitating trade, they eventually expanded to include investment 
protection provisions.17 In particular, the more modern versions included guarantees of prompt, 
 
12 Id.  
13 Id.   
14 Id. at 329 n.7. 
 
15 Not surprisingly, gunboat diplomacy caused much of Latin American to become hostile to 
foreign investment.  See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 74-75.  This hostility began to 
dissipate in the 1980s as emerging economies in Latin America began actively encouraging the 
investment necessary to finance development.  See id. 
 
16 See id. at 72-73; Franck, supra note 2, at 1525-26 (citing E.I. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 119-22 (1965)).  In an effort to 
protect increasing amounts of foreign investment, the United States took a particular interest in 
these treaties.  Salacuse & Sullivan, supra. Eventually, the effort lost momentum as developing 
countries proved increasingly reluctant to accede to U.S. demands.  Id. at 73. 
 
17 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72-73.  In the immediate post-World War II period, 
the United States initiated a program of concluding Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation in an effort to protect U.S. foreign investments.  See id. 
5adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation,18 which were enforced through methods 
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).19 While the development of the guarantees 
proved important, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation still proved far from 
acceptable to risk-adverse investors.20 In part, investors remained hesitant to make foreign 
investments because the successful resolution of claims required the investor’s home state to 
espouse a claim before the ICJ.21 Given the politically sensitive nature of this process, state 
support was not always forthcoming.   
Eventually, the absence of a direct method for resolving investment claims under Treaties 
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, prompted the development of the modern BIT.22 One 
of the primary advantages of this new mechanism was the inclusion of provisions that allowed 
 
18 David R. Adair, Comment, Investors’ Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment 
Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 195, 196 (1999).  The early Treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation merely proposed obligations regarding expropriation and repatriation 
of earnings.  Id. 
19 Id. The International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, is the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations.  International Court of Justice: General Information – The Court at 
a Glance, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2006). 
 
20 Adair, supra note 18, at 196-99. 
 
21 Because the ICJ was established by the United Nations to resolve disputes between member 
nations, only states may appear before the Court.  International Court of Justice: General 
Information – The Court at a Glance, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).  Consequently, 
individuals are dependent on states to advocate claims at the ICJ.   
 
22 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1525-26 (noting that the movement to use treaties to protect 
investments “began with Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, but soon moved 
beyond this as these treaties were limited commitments that did not have a forum for resolving 
disputes”). 
 
6investors greater autonomy over claims against a host country.23 The greater security offered by 
these BITs promoted increased investment, and rendered the investment protection aspects of 
earlier treaties irrelevant.24 
B. Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way and Follow Later. 
Although the BIT was an idea whose time had come, its adoption did not take place 
uniformly.25 Instead, the process occurred in three distinct waves.26 As will be shown, each 
wave was characterized by distinct motivations and goals.   
 1. Lead: German ingenuity. 
 Not surprisingly, the BIT revolution was born of necessity.  Following its unmitigated 
defeat in the Second World War, Germany found itself economically crippled and without any 
significant sources of foreign investment.27 As a result, it initiated a new phase of treaty-making 
that, “unlike the previous commercial agreements, dealt exclusively with foreign investment.”28 
This novel approach possessed two principle advantages over earlier initiatives.  First, the 
specialized nature of the BIT helped avoid some of the problems associated with Treaties of 
 
23 See id. at 1529 (noting that investment treaties are special because “they offer investors direct 
remedies to address violations of” substantive rights). 
 
24 See id. at 1526-27.  One of the indicators of the importance of a direct method for investors to 
pursue remedies is the exceptional success of the BIT movement. 
 
25 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73-75. 
 
26 See id.; Franck, supra note 3, at 1527 n.16. 
 
27 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73. 
 
28 Id. Germany remains a world leader in BIT formation.  Id. at 73 n.35. 
 
7Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, which were designed primarily to facilitate trade.29 
Second, the bilateral nature of the approach allowed for greater flexibility in negotiating and 
drafting terms.30 
Prior to the BIT movement, investors still faced significant risk when investing in foreign 
countries.31 In the face of government expropriation of foreign property, investors had little 
recourse.32 Although an investor could bring a claim for recovery in the local courts, this 
“prove[d] to be of little value in the face of prejudice against foreigners or governmental 
interference in the judicial process.”33 Moreover, host governments could easily change their 
domestic law at anytime after the investment was made.34 Consequently, investors had to rely on 
the benevolence of the host country or the diplomatic support of their own government.  
Understandably, neither of these options proved sufficiently comforting.35 Even after the 
 
29 See id. at 75-79 (explaining the goals of the BIT movement). 
 
30 See id. at 77-79 (explaining the reluctance to join multilateral agreements on investment). 
 
31 See, e.g., id. at 75-76 (“Without a BIT, international investors are forced to rely on host 
country law alone for protection, which entails a variety of risks to their investments.  Host 
governments can easily change their own domestic law after a foreign investment is made, and 
host country officials may not always act fairly or impartially toward foreign investors and their 
enterprises.”). 
 
32 See, e.g., id. at 75. 
 
33 Id. 
 
34 Id. 
 
35 This is demonstrated by the rise and rapid proliferation of the BIT.  For a detailed analysis of 
the success of the BIT movement in fostering investment protection, see Jesawald W. Salacuse & 
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 79-91 (2005) (noting that “[w]hile that protection 
is not absolute (no legal device provides absolute protection), investors and investments that are 
covered by a BIT certainly enjoy a higher degree of protection from the political risks of 
governmental intervention than those that are not”). 
8proliferation of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, an investor still had to rely 
on his own government to support his claim before the ICJ.36 Given that even this step failed to 
ameliorate the risks investors faced when deciding whether to enter foreign markets, it is not 
surprising that the BIT was created.   
In direct response to the problems of uncertainty that surrounded foreign direct 
investment, the BIT provided two essential guarantees.37 First, it guaranteed the application of a 
specific set of substantive rights.38 Second, it guaranteed recourse to direct remedies for the 
investor.39 Although these aspects of the BIT will be discussed in greater detail later, it is 
important to note that the success of the BIT program is in large part linked to these investment-
specific protections. 
 It should come as no surprise that Germany was not the only nation that emerged from 
the Second World War seeking a means to better facilitate foreign direct investment.  In fact, 
several attempts to do so had already failed before Germany successfully negotiated its first 
BIT.40 What distinguished the German effort was a focus on bilateral rather than multilateral 
agreement. 
 
36 See supra text accompanying notes 16-22. 
 
37 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1529 (noting that “[i]nvestment treaties have two fundamental 
innovations, which represent a departure from previous international agreements”); see also 
Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the 
Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 311-13 (2004) 
(highlighting substantive and procedural issues related to BITs). 
 
38 Franck, supra note 2, at 1529.   
 
39 Id. 
40 Germany’s first BIT was concluded with Pakistan in 1959.  Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, 
at 73.  Earlier attempts at creating investment-specific protections included the Havana Charter 
9The first attempt to create international rules to protect foreign direct investment was the 
Havana Charter of 1948.41 Intended to create the International Trade Organization, the Havana 
Charter failed to gain the support of a sufficient number of states.42 Subsequent efforts, 
including one by the International Chamber of Commerce, suffered similar fates.43 The failure 
of these multilateral attempts is understandable given the marked difference between the 
objectives of capital-exporting states and developing ones.44 Germany’s contribution then, was 
 
of 1948, the International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment of 1949, and the 
International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Rights in Foreign Countries of 
1957.  Id. at 72. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id.  The proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) would have been given the power to 
promulgate rules regarding international investment.  Id. Although the effort to create the ITO 
failed, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is beginning to consider the possibility of creating 
rules governing international investment.  See WTO, Understanding the WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) 
(explaining the creation of a new working group to examine the WTO’s role in investment and 
competition). 
 
43 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 72.  The effort of the International Chamber of 
Commerce was called the International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment.  Id. 
44 Id. at 77-78.  The distinction between capital-exporting states and developing states is of 
unique importance in international investment.  One of the reasons that BITs were created was to 
facilitate investment by investors from the developed world into the developing one (which had 
traditionally been very poor at protecting foreign investment).  Although both capital-exporting 
states and developing ones have reasons to support the bilateral process, the reasons are different.  
See id. at 78. On the one hand, capitol-exporting states want to maximize the protections 
afforded to their nationals who invest in other states.  See id.  On the other hand, developing 
states want to increase investment inflows while at the same time protect domestic industry from 
foreign competition.  See id.  As a result, capital-exporting states favor the bilateral process 
because they can maximize their bargaining power over a developing state, while developing 
states favor the bilateral process because they can choose the countries with which it is most 
beneficial for them to deal.  See id. For a more thorough explanation of the perspectives of 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states, see Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little 
Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State 
Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 314-16 (2004). 
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to recognize that the competing objectives could be addressed more effectively in a bilateral 
context than in a multilateral one. 
 2. Follow: The rest of the West catches up. 
 The second wave of BIT proliferation was driven by the balance of Western economic 
powers.45 Although Germany was first out of the gate to begin negotiating BITs, it did not take 
long for other European nations to follow suit.  Particularly quick to follow the trend were 
Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium.46 Recognizing the 
importance of this new method of investment protection, European countries had concluded 
approximately 130 BITs with developing countries by 1977.47 
Despite coming to the game late, the United States was also eager to play.  Consequently, 
it launched its own BIT program in 1981.48 As of the end of September 2004, the United States 
had “signed forty-five BITs with developing countries and emerging markets.”49 
Although the second wave of BIT proliferation began in the West, it continued to spread 
as east non-Western countries began to export increasing amounts of capital into the developing 
world.  Encouraged by the experiences of the Western powers, countries such as Japan and 
Kuwait began launching their own BIT programs.50 
45 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 73-75. 
 
46 See id. at 73. 
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. at 73-74. 
 
49 Id. at 74. 
 
50 Id. (noting that “by 1997, Japan has signed four BITS, and Kuwait had signed twenty-two”). 
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3. Get out of the way and follow later: Latin American and former Soviet 
states get with the program. 
 
In the thaw following the Cold War, developing economies became increasingly eager to 
court foreign investment.51 With the abandonment of the centralized economic model in many 
parts of the world, nations that had traditionally been hostile to foreign investment now saw it as 
essential for financing development.52 Capital-exporting states, however, were understandably 
reluctant to invest money in these nations given their history of expropriating foreign 
businesses.53 In an effort to overcome their image problem, “developing countries started to 
assume that they should consider offering guaranties and protection to foreign investment.”54 As 
a result, the governments of those countries began to pursue BITs with wealthier, industrialized 
nations.55 
Of particular importance to the third wave of BIT proliferation was the end of Latin 
American hostility to protections for foreign direct investment.  After decades of subscribing to 
 
51 See id. 
 
52 See id. 
 
53 See id. at 75 (noting that “the number of expropriations of foreign-owned property grew 
steadily each year from 1960 and reached its peak in the mid-1970s”).  In 2002, the World Bank 
Group surveyed transnational companies regarding the factors important to encouraging and 
discouraging foreign direct investment.  Garcia, supra note 37, at 320.  Of particular relevance to 
this comment, the survey noted that the existence of a BIT was considered a “very influential” 
factor in selecting overseas sites by ten percent of manufacturing companies and sixteen percent 
of service companies.  Id. 
54 Raul Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 501, 504 (2002) 
(“Credibility went hand in hand with the acceptance by states of their international liability in the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments.”); see also Garcia, supra note 37, at 307 
(noting that “[i]n regions like Latin America…the inadequacies in the domestic legal 
order…make it an undependable means of safeguarding investments”). 
 
55 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 74-75. 
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the Calvo Doctrine, which limited a foreign investor’s remedies to those available in the 
domestic court system, Latin American countries began reconsidering their approach to foreign 
investment.56 Not surprisingly, at some point, it became clear that foreign direct investment 
would tend to flow away from states that failed to offer increasing amounts of protection.  In an 
effort to attract some of this investment, Latin American countries began showing their 
newfound investment-friendly credentials by participating in the BIT program.57 As of August 
2002, they had made significant progress.58 
C. The Current Proliferation of the BIT 
 Although understanding the history of BIT proliferation is important, it is also important 
to understand its current scope.  Predictably, with the lifting of the iron curtain came a renewed 
interest in market economics and foreign direct investment.59 As the developing world 
discovered, the BIT often acted as a key to opening the golden door to foreign funds.60 
Consequently, there has been an explosion in the number of BITs concluded since the collapse of 
 
56 See Kishoiyian, supra note 2, at 366; supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
 
57 See Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 505 & n.16. 
 
58 See id. at 505 n.16. 
 
59 Supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 
60 Supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.  “Developing country governments that may have 
been reluctant to sign BITs due to concerns that BITs would prove costly and bring them little 
additional investment may now see evidence of increase capital flows as reason to justify treaty 
participation, particularly if other countries with whom they compete for foreign capital have 
signed BITs and obtained significant foreign investment.  Although BIT critics in developing 
countries point to the increased number of arbitration awards against developing countries as 
justification for their opposition, evidence of substantially increased investment flows severely 
weakens their position.”  Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 111-12 (internal citations 
omitted).  “The proliferation of BITs was the direct consequence of new trends towards a market 
economy where foreign investment in developing countries was the master key to integrate those 
countries into fruitful global economy relationships.”  Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 504. 
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the Soviet Union.61 As a result of this recent explosion, a dense network of BITs links over 170 
different countries.62 As two commentators note, “Whereas some 309 BITs had been concluded 
by the end of 1988, 2181 were concluded by 2002.”63 When one considers that each of these 
BITs involves two countries, the scope of the movement’s success becomes evident.   
 D. The Unique Qualities of the BIT 
 The success of the BIT as a means for protecting foreign direct investment rightly 
suggests that it possesses unique and important qualities.  In contrast to earlier attempts at 
investment protection, the BIT provides investors specific substantive rights and direct 
remedies.64 The importance of these two developments can be deduced not only from the sheer 
number of BITs now in existence, but also from the accompanying dramatic increase in foreign 
direct investment.65 
1. Provision of specific substantive rights 
Despite the number of BITs in existence, the general substantive provisions of each are 
remarkably similar.66 Although there are differences that arise from each unique treaty-specific 
 
61 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 75. 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 Supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 
65 “Over the past three decades in particular, BITs have proliferated as foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has experienced phenomenal growth.  Total annual FDI reached $1.1 trillion in 2000, a 
drastic increase from $25 billion in 1973.”  Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 71 (internal 
citations omitted).  “At the same time as the number of bilateral investment treaties quintupled, 
foreign direct investment has also experienced a fivefold increase.”  Franck, supra note 2, at 
1528. 
 
66 Franck, supra note 3, at 1529. 
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negotiation process, there are also discernable trends regarding the rights that states offer.67 
Nevertheless, the basic principle is that sovereign governments agree to protect investments 
made by nationals of another country.68 To accomplish this goal, BITs delineate “the specific 
substantive standards that govern the host state’s treatment of an investment.”69 
Again, despite the fact that different permutations of substantive rights are the norm, “[a] 
typical investment treaty generally provides investors with a combination of up to seven different 
substantive rights.”70 First, the treaty generally provides a guarantee that investors will receive 
payment of adequate compensation if their property is expropriated.71 Second, the treaty 
generally prohibits the contracting states from hindering the free flow of capital by enacting 
currency controls.72 Third, the treaty generally prohibits the host state from discriminating on 
 
67 Id. 
 
68Id. “In general terms, a BIT contains provisions on guaranties for the admission of foreign 
investments, as well as guaranties for sums transferred abroad related to the investments.”  
Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 506. 
 
69 Franck, supra note 2, at 1529. 
 
70 Id. at 1530. 
 
71Id.; Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 506.  The U.S. Model BIT contains the following language: 
“Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”), except: (a) for 
a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum 
Standard ofTreatment](1) through (3).” 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
art. 6(1), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pd
f (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 
72 Franck, supra note 2, at 1530.  The U.S. Model BIT contains the following language: “Each 
Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without 
delay into and out of its territory.”  2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 
7(1), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pd
15
the basis of nationality.73 Fourth, the treaty generally requires the host-state to treat investments 
fairly and equitably.74 Fifth, the treaty generally requires the host-state to provide full protection 
and security to investments.75 Sixth, the treaty generally requires the contracting states to 
guarantee that investments will not receive treatment less favorable than the “minimum standard 
 
f (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).  As two commentators note, “For any foreign investment project, 
the ability to repatriate income and capital, to pay foreign obligations in another currency, and to 
purchase raw materials and spare parts from abroad is crucial to a project’s success.”  Salacuse & 
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 85.  Consequently, capital-exporting states press for substantial 
freedom to undertake these monetary transactions.  Id. 
73 Franck, supra note 2, at 1530-31.  The non-discrimination principle generally provides that 
host-states cannot treat investors worse than domestic citizens (national treatment) or other 
foreigners (most-favored nation treatment).  Id. The U.S. Model BIT contains the following 
language regarding national treatment: “Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments in its territory.”  2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty art. 3(1), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pd
f (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).  It also contains the following language regarding most-favored 
nation treatment: “Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory.”  2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty art. 4(1), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pd
f (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 
74 Franck, supra note 2, at 1531.  The U.S. Model BIT contains the following language: “Each 
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international 
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”  2004 United States 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 5(1), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pd
f (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 
75 Franck, supra note 2, at 1531-32.  Like the provision for fair and equitable treatment, the 
provision for full protection and security is contained within article 5(1) of the 2004 United 
States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty.  Supra note 74. 
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required by customary international law.”76 Finally, the treaty will occasionally include 
provisions specifying that the contracting states agree to honor commitments that they have 
given regarding an investment.77 
In addition to providing specific protections, BITs must also define which investors and 
investments qualify to receive those protections.78 Generally the provisions regarding the scope 
of a BIT’s application are found at the beginning of the treaty and address four factors: “(1) the 
form of the investment; (2) the area of the investment’s economic activity; (3) the time when the 
investment is made; and (4) the investor’s connection with the other contracting state.”79 Despite 
the fact that there are several factors, BITs typically define investor and investment broadly.80 
This, in turn, enables the treaty to provide adequate protection and allow for an evolving 
understanding of investment.81 
2. Provision of direct remedies for investors 
 Although BITs contain considerable substantive rights for investors and investments, 
they are somewhat superfluous without corresponding procedural rights.  Consequently, the 
other essential aspect of the BIT is the provision of direct remedies for investors.  Rather than 
 
76 Franck, supra note 2, at 1532.  Again, like the provisions for fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security, the provision for treatment in accordance with customary 
international law is contained within article 5(1) of the 2004 United States Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty.  Supra notes 74, 75. 
 
77 Franck, supra note 2, at 1532. 
 
78 Id. at 1533. 
 
79 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 80. 
 
80Id.; Franck, supra note 2, at 1533. 
 
81 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 80. 
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leaving an investor to pursue his claim through the cumbersome ICJ process or the host state’s 
domestic court system, BITs often allow an investor the ability to proceed directly to 
arbitration.82 Although BITs generally provide investors with the option of pursuing litigation in 
the host-state, this option is rarely used.83 Instead, investors routinely choose to arbitrate their 
claims.84 While dispute resolution provisions in BITs often differ in scope and content, “they are 
generally understood to constitute a unilateral offer by the Sovereign to settle disputes by 
arbitration, which the investor accepts by initiating arbitration under the treaty.”85 
That BIT dispute resolution provisions grant private investors the right to bring an action 
against a sovereign state before an international tribunal should not be overlooked.86 Indeed, it 
represents a unique departure from the customary practice of nations.87 Rather than having to 
receive approval to pursue a claim, an investor is allowed to act without regard for the concerns 
and interests of his own state.88 In effect, the current investment-treaty regime allows “investors 
 
82 Franck, supra note 2, at 1540; supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
 
83 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1541. 
 
84 See id. 
 
85 Id. at 1542; Garcia, supra note 37, at 312 (“No arbitration clause or further consent to arbitrate 
is required as the treaties themselves provide for this a priori.”). 
 
86 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 88. 
 
87 See id. In internatonal trade law, for example, there is no provision for private action against a 
sovereign state.  Id.  Despite the fact that individuals suffer harm as a result of trade law 
infringements, only states may bring claims before the World Trade Organization.  Id. 
 
88 See id.; Garcia, supra note 37, at 312 (noting that “the government of the foreign investor 
(e.g., the other state party to the treaty) has no say or role whatsoever in the initiation or outcome 
of the proceedings”); Franck, supra note 2, at 1538 (“This means investors are no longer at the 
mercy of international politics and governmental bureaucracy when deciding to initiate dispute 
resolution, and can avoid their litigation being swallowed by the larger foreign relations 
dialogue.”). 
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to act like ‘private attorney generals,’ and places the enforcement of public international law 
rights in the hands of private individuals and corporations.”89 Given this type of autonomy, it is 
not surprising that investors gain significant confidence from knowing that their investments are 
covered by a BIT.90 
III. THE ROLE OF ICSID IN THE BIT REGIME 
 A. Purpose and Creation 
Although the creation of the BIT allowed investors significant latitude in bringing claims 
against a sovereign state, this right proved rather hollow without a neutral forum for resolving 
disputes.  Consequently, the creation of such a forum proved an essential event in the history of 
international investment protection. 
As an international institution that provides loans to its member countries in order to 
foster greater production and development, the World Bank (the Bank) plays a significant role in 
international investment.91 In fact, the Bank’s “founders believed that its principal function 
would be to encourage international investment by private investors.”92 As a result, it is not 
surprising that in the early days of the BIT movement the World Bank received requests to help 
 
89 Id.; see generally Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment Law, 20
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 465 (2005) (arguing that international investment law shifts power and 
authority from states to investors, tribunals, and other decision-makers). 
 
90 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1538 (noting that the system of allowing investors to bring claims 
against sovereign states “created a mechanism to bolster investors’ confidence that they will 
receive a ‘fair shake’ when resolving disputes with Sovereigns, thus reducing the risks associated 
with investment and, arguably, increasing the incentive to investment abroad”). 
 
91 See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 23. 
 
92 Id. 
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settle dispute among member states by acting as a neutral advisor.93 Although the Bank 
attempted to mediate the disputes, concerns regarding its proper role caused it to consider new 
solutions.94 One of the proposed solutions, presented in 1961, examined the feasibility of 
creating an arbitration mechanism that could suit the needs of both investors and governments.95 
The ultimate result of this proposal was the establishment of ICSID under the International 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) in 1966.96 The 
purpose of this new body was to provide proceedings “for the conciliation and arbitration of 
investment disputes between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states.”97 
Moreover, ICSID sought to assure foreign investors that they would receive protection from the 
unilateral actions of a host country.98 In other words, ICSID intended to balance the power 
inequity between investors and host countries by providing a “purely international dispute 
resolution forum.”99 
B. Composition of ICSID 
 
93 See Sedlak, supra note 7, at 150. 
 
94 See id. 
 
95 See id. at 150-51. 
 
96 See id. at 151.  “On October 14, 1966, after years of preparatory work by legal experts from 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the United States and after approval by the Board of 
Governors of the World Bank, ICSID came into force as an autonomous international agency 
under the auspices of the World Bank.”  Id.   
 
97 Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 502; see Sedlak, supra note 7, at 151 (“The role of ICSID was to 
arbitrate and conciliate investment disputes between signatory states and investors of those states 
that were signatories to the convention.”). 
98 See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 23. 
 
99 Sedlak, supra note 7, at 153. 
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 The ICSID convention provides for the creation of an Administrative Council, a 
Secretariat, a Panel of Arbitrators, and a Panel of Conciliators.100 Although these four organs 
play an important role in facilitating the arbitration process, the actual work of hearing disputes 
and ruling on the merits is the task of individual arbitral panels assembled under the auspices and 
according to the rules of ICSID.  For the purposes of this comment, only the administrative 
bodies of the organization merit further attention and explanation here. 
 1. The Administrative Council 
 The Administrative Council (the Council) is composed of one representative from each 
state that is a party to the ICSID Convention.101 In addition, the President of the World Bank 
serves as the Chairman of the Council.102 As the governing body of ICSID, the Council has a 
range of duties and is responsible for exercising whatever powers are necessary to implement the 
provisions of the ICSID Convention.103 
100 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes arts. 3-16, Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1273-77, 575 U.N.T.S. 162-170; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25. 
 
101 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 4, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1273, 575 U.N.T.S. 164; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.  Because the member of the 
Council are government representatives, they receive no remuneration from ICSID.  Nmehielle, 
supra.
102 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 5, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1274, 575 U.N.T.S. 164.  The Chairman has no vote in the Council.  Id. 
103 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes arts. 6(1)(a)-(g), 6(3), 
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1274-75, 575 U.N.T.S. 1164-65.  The obligations and powers of the 
Council include the following: “(a) adopt[ing] the administrative and financial regulations of the 
Centre; (b) adopt[ing] the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings; (c) adopt[ing] the rules of procedure for conciliation and arbitration proceedings 
(hereinafter called the Conciliation Rules and the Arbitration Rules); (d) approv[ing] 
arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's administrative facilities and services; (e) 
determin[ing] the conditions of service of the Secretary-General and of any Deputy Secretary-
General; (f) adopt[ing] the annual budget of revenues and expenditures of the Centre; (g) 
approv[ing] the annual report on the operation of the Centre.”  Id. at arts. 6(1)(a)-(g). 
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 2. The Secretariat 
 The Secretariat consists of the Secretary-General, at least one Deputy Secretary-General, 
and staff.104 The higher positions, Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, are elected 
by the Administrative Council upon the recommendation of the Chairman.105 As the principal 
administrative organ of ICSID, the Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day running of the 
Centre.106 The Secretary-General, the principal officer of the Centre, performs the function of 
Registrar and also has the power to authenticate awards arising from the ICSID process.107 In 
contrast to the member of the Administrative Council, the officers of the Secretariat are non-
political.108 
C. The Arbitration Process 
 The arbitral tribunals assembled under ICSID’s essentially act as international investment 
courts.  Given this role and the increasingly frequent use of ICSID to resolve investment disputes 
that arise under BITs, it is important to examine the arbitral process itself. 
 1. Jurisdiction 
 
104 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 9, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1275, 575 U.N.T.S. 166; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.  
 
105 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 10(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1275-76, 575 U.N.T.S. 166-68; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.  
 
106 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 11, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1276, 575 U.N.T.S. 168; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.  
 
107 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 9, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1275, 575 U.N.T.S. 166; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.  
 
108 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 10(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1275-76, 575 U.N.T.S. 166-68; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 25.  
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 As with any formal court system, an ICSID tribunal must have jurisdiction to hear a 
dispute.  Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides the basic understanding of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction:   
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision 
or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.109 
For the purpose of this comment, it is important to note that the consent of states that have 
signed the ICSID Convention can be presumed if ICSID arbitration is provided for in a BIT.110 
Consequently, once a sovereign state signs a BIT that allows for ICSID arbitration, it may not be 
able to withdraw from arbitration with an investor from the other signatory country.  Not 
surprisingly, a large number of countries are effectively locked in to the ICSID system as a result 
of their BITs. 
 2. Initiating Arbitration 
 
109 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. 174; Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 503 (“ICSID Arbitration Tribunals 
(Tribunal) dealing with BITS assumed that article 25 of the Convention is the basic rule that 
determined the ICSID’s jurisdiction, and, as a consequence, that of its tribunals.”). 
 
110 See Vinuesa, supra note 54, at 503.  In an ICSID arbitration involving the U.S. and Argentina, 
the arbitral tribunal concluded that the relevant BIT constituted consent to arbitration before 
ICSID.  Id. Consequently, “the consent of the respondent state arises from its generic offer of 
submission to ICSID arbitration as determined by the Convention.”  Id. According to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), BITs that reference ICSID may 
contain the host state’s offer to submit to ICSID jurisdiction.  CHRISTOPH SCHREURER,
UNCTAD: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES: 2.3 CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 17 (2003), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add2_en.pdf.  Furthermore, “[c]onsent through BITs 
has become accepted practice.”  Id. UNCTAD emphasizes the importance of this practice by 
noting that ICSID clauses can be found in the “overwhelming majority” of new BITs.  Id. 
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 An ICSID arbitration may be initiated by a state that is party to the ICSID Convention, or 
by a national of a state that is a party to the Convention.111 Unless the case is manifestly outside 
the scope of the Centre’s jurisdiction, the Secretary-General will register the request for 
arbitration.112 
3. Selection of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 Once the dispute is registered, the arbitral tribunal is constituted according to the 
agreement of the parties.113 In the absence of an agreement, the tribunal will be composed of 
three arbitrators.114 Each party to the dispute will select one arbitrator, and the third (the 
President of the Tribunal) is selected by agreement of the parties.115 In the event that the parties 
 
111 Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28.  For a detailed account of the initiation process, as well as the 
materials that must accompany the initiation, see ERIC SCHWARTZ & REZA MOHTASHAMI,
UNCTAD: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES: 2.7 PROCEDURAL ISSUES 7-10 (2003), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add6_en.pdf. 
 
112 Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28.   
 
113 See id.; SCHWARTZ & MOHTASHAMI, supra note 111, at 11.  Although the parties have broad 
discretion in designating arbitrators, three restrictions may apply.  First, the majority of 
arbitrators must be nationals of states other than the states represented in the suit.  International 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 39, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 
575 U.N.T.S. 184.  “This prohibition does not apply if each arbitrator has been chosen by 
agreement of the parties.”  SCHWARTZ & MOHTASHAMI, supra at 14.  Second, the arbitrators 
must meet the qualifications of Article 14(1).  Id.; International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes art. 40(2), supra, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 184.  Consequently, they 
must have high moral character; recognized competence in law, commerce, industry, or finance; 
and reliability to exercise independent judgment.  International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes art. 14(1), supra, 17 U.S.T. 1277, 575 U.N.T.S. 168.  Third, the arbitrators 
must be independent of the parties to the dispute.  SCHWARTZ & MOHTASHAMI, supra at 14-15. 
 
114 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1285, 575 U.N.T.S. 184; see Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28. 
 
115 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1285, 575 U.N.T.S. 184; see Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28. 
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cannot agree on the appointment of the arbitrators, the Chairman of the Administrative Council, 
after consulting with the parties, will appoint the remaining arbitrators.116 
4. Recognition and enforcement of awards 
 The effectiveness of an arbitration ultimately depends on whether the winning party can 
enforce its claim against the losing party.117 As a result, Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention 
contains the following language:  
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A 
Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or 
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award 
as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.118 
Although execution of ICSID awards is the norm, it should not be taken for granted.119 While 
the ICSID Convention does provide for recognition of the award, Article 55 contains the 
following condition: “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in 
force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from 
execution.”120 Unfortunately, this language leaves a loophole in favor of states party to a 
 
116 See International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 38, Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1285-86, 575 U.N.T.S. 184; Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 28.  “The appointments 
made by the Chairman of the Administrative Council must be made from the Panel.”  SCHWARTZ 
& MOHTASHAMI, supra note 111, at 15; International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes art. 40(1), supra, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 184. 
 
117 Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 29. 
 
118 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. 184. 
 
119 See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 29-30.  Here, it is important to note that the ICSID 
Convention treats execution as a distinct aspect of enforcement.  Id. at 29.   
 
120 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 55, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1292, 575 U.N.T.S. 194. 
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dispute.121 The problem arises when a state’s domestic law prevents execution of the award 
because of its provisions providing for sovereign immunity.122 Again, despite this loophole, 
execution of awards remains the rule rather than the exception.123 
D. From Neglect to Preeminence 
 Although ICSID was established in 1966, it did not assemble its first arbitral tribunal 
until 1972.124 The pace of cases brought before the Centre remained slow for decades, and it is 
only recently that the number of cases has increased sharply.125 In fact, more half of ICSID’s 
total caseload “has been launched in the last five years.”126 To illustrate, filings have increased 
from “approximately one per year in the 1980s to one or two per month in 2001.”127 While the 
 
121 See Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L
& COMP. L. 21, 31 (2001).   
 
122 “The reason for this disparity in enforcing an ICSID arbitral award is that the ICSID 
Convention does not alter or supersede the rules of immunity from execution against a state 
which fails to comply with an ICSID award.”  Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 30-31.  For a detailed 
discussion of the problems inherent in executing an ICSID award, see id. at 31-39. 
 
123 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  Whether this trend in execution is the result of 
contractual provisions waiving sovereign immunity or the result of efforts by states to avoid 
international condemnation is unclear. 
 
124 See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2006). 
 
125 ICSID, About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 
2006). 
 
126 Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct 
Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 55 (2005); see 
Franck, supra note 2, at 1521. 
 
127 Franck, supra note 2, at 1538. 
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reasons for this explosion are unclear, it may be tied to the recent growth in foreign-direct 
investment and the increasingly large network of BITs.128 
In addition to the increased caseload, the importance of ICSID in international 
investment arbitration is also demonstrated by the number of states that are party to the ICSID 
Convention and the number of instruments that provide for it as a dispute resolution mechanism.  
Currently, 143 nations have signed and ratified the Convention, and another twelve have signed 
but not ratified.129 Moreover, “advance consents to submit investment disputes to ICSID 
arbitration are found in about twenty national investment laws, in over 900 BITs, and under four 
recent multilateral trade and investment treaties.”130 
Given the importance of ICSID arbitration to the international investment protection 
regime, it is necessary and appropriate to examine inconsistencies in the decisions and 
interpretations of ICSID tribunals.  The lack of customary international law governing the 
treatment of international investments makes the current BIT regime essential to the protection 
of international investors and investments.  Considering that BIT provisions are enforced 
through arbitration, it follows that the practice of arbitral tribunals should face significant 
scrutiny.131 Although no tribunal is bound by the precedents of earlier arbitrations, 
 
128 See id. 
 
129 See ICSID, List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-
en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006). 
 
130 Sedlak, supra note 7, at 152 (citing ICSID, About ICSID, 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm).  The four multilateral agreements are the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the 
Cartagena Free Trade Agreement and the Colonia Investment Protocol of Mercosur.  ICSID, 
About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006). 
 
131 “Although some commentators suggest that an occasional ‘wrong’ decision is a small price to 
pay for promoting aggregate gain through investment arbitration, the magnitude and the 
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inconsistencies could frustrate the purpose of the BIT and investment arbitration regimes by 
fostering uncertainty regarding rights and obligations.132 
IV. ICSID’S CONFUSED DECISIONS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF MOST-
FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
 
Despite the fact that ICSID has been around since the 1960s, it has only recently begun to 
address the scope of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses within BITs.133 Unfortunately, now 
that it has, the results are inconsistent.134 
A. MFN Clauses in BITs 
 MFN treatment has been an important feature of international trade policy for 
centuries.135 More recently, however, MFN clauses have extended into international investment 
policy.136 In fact, the majority of BITS currently in force around the world contain some form of 
 
increasing frequency of the inconsistency suggests that this conclusion should be reconsidered.”  
Franck, supra note 2, at 1558 (internal citation omitted). 
 
132 “Inconsistency creates uncertainty and damages the legitimate expectations of investors and 
Sovereigns.  Investors that have structured their investments in a manner to take advantage of 
coverage afforded by investment treaties suddenly discover they will not receive those benefits.  
Likewise, Sovereigns find themselves in an untenable position of explaining to taxpayers why 
they are subject to damage awards for hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in one case but not 
another.”  Id. 
133 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; infra notes 141-247 and accompanying text. 
 
134 See infra notes 141-247 and accompanying text. 
 
135 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MOST-FAVOURED-
NATION TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdf.  “[MFN treatment] can be traced back to the 
twelfth century, although the phrase seems to have first appeared in the seventeenth century.  
MFN treaty clauses spread with the growth of commerce in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.”  Id. 
 
136 “The inclusion of MFN clauses became a general practice in the numerous bilateral, regional 
and multilateral investment-related agreements which were concluded after…1950.”  
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 135, at 3. 
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MFN clause.137 Generally, the clauses require each contracting state to provide to investors of 
the other contracting state treatment that is “no less favourable than that accorded to the 
investors of third states.”138 Consequently, any favorable provision provided for in a BIT will be 
available to every other country with which the host country has a BIT containing an MFN 
clause.139 In effect, an MFN clause raises the “level of protection guaranteed by each BIT 
concluded by a country to the level guaranteed by that country’s most protective BIT.”140 
B. Interpreting the scope of MFN clauses 
 Given that the inclusion of an MFN clause in a BIT can effectively raise the level of 
protection to that of the most protective BIT, it is not surprising that investors and host states 
would argue over the proper scope of such clauses.  Investors, of course, argue for the greatest 
possible protection; host states argue for the least possible protection.  Although well recognized 
methods of interpretation exist, tribunals may still reach different conclusions.141 In fact, several 
 
137 Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?, 8 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 131, 131 (2005). 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 See id. By including MFN clauses in BITs states require “parties to one treaty to provide 
investors with treatment that is no less favourable than the treatment provided by them to other 
investors under other treaties.”  Id. 
 
140 FEDERICO GODOY, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT 
1-2 (2002), available at http://www.bkgfirm.com/admin/pixAdmin/pubs/162FEN.pdf. 
141 When interpreting treaty provisions, the primary aim is to identify the intent of the contracting 
parties.  See Fietta, supra note 137, at 132.  This approach is adopted by Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Generally accepted as a rule of customary international law, 
Article 31 states that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 340; 
see Fietta, supra at 131.  Another important principle of interpretation is that of ejusdem generis.
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ICSID arbitral tribunals already have.  These MFN clause arbitrations can be divided into two 
distinct classes.  The first deals with expansive interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses; the 
second deals with narrow interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses.  Although the cases 
mentioned do not constitute an exhaustive list of ICSID tribunal decisions on the issue, they are 
representative. 
 C. Expansive Interpretations 
In both cases in this section, investors attempted to avoid specific language within a BIT 
that required a waiting period to expire before a case could be submitted to ICSID arbitration.  
Arguing that the MFN clauses should be interpreted broadly, the investors asserted that they 
were entitled to select individual BIT provisions provided for in other BITs.  In particular, the 
investors argued that the MFN clause in the BIT that applied to their dispute entitled them to the 
procedures that existed in one of the host state’s other BITs.  In both cases, the arbitral tribunals 
interpreted the scope of the MFN clauses expansively. 
 1. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain 
On July 18, 1997, ICSID received a formal request for arbitration against the Kingdom of 
Spain (Spain) from an Argentine national, Mr. Emilio Agustín Maffezini.142 Maffezini’s request 
concerned treatment that he allegedly received from the Spanish government in connection with 
 
See Fietta, supra at 132.  According to this principle, “an MFN clause ‘can only attract matters 
belonging to the same category of subjects as that to which the clause itself relates.’”  Id. 
 
142 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 
25, 2000, ¶1, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/emilio_DecisiononJurisdiction.pdf. 
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an investment in an enterprise involving the production and distribution of chemical products in 
Spain.143 
In his request for arbitration, Maffezini invoked the provisions of the Argentina-Spain 
BIT.144 This, however, was insufficient to establish that ICSID had jurisdiction over the dispute 
because the Argentina-Spain BIT required that an investor allow the Spanish courts eighteen 
months to process the claim before being allowed to submit the claim to international 
arbitration.145 To avoid the delay and the expense of litigating in Spain, Maffezini asserted that 
the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT “allowed him to rely upon the more favorable 
 
143 Id. 
144 Id. The formal name of the BIT between Argentina and Spain concluded in 1991 is the 
“Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Kingdom 
of Spain and the Argentine Republic.”  Id. 
145 See id. ¶19.  Article X.3 of the Argentina-Spain BIT, which addresses the “Settlement of 
Disputes Between a Contracting Party and an Investor of the other Contracting Party,” reads as 
follows: “The dispute may be submitted to international arbitration in any of the following 
circumstances: a) at the request of one of the parties to the dispute, if no decision has been 
rendered on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period of eighteen months from the 
date on which the proceedings referred to in paragraph 2 of the Article have been initiated, or if 
such decision has been rendered, but the dispute between the parties continues.”  Id. 
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treatment Spain offered to Chilean investors in the Spain-Chile BIT.”146 The Spain-Chile BIT 
required a mere six-month waiting period before an investor could file a claim at ICSID.147 
Not surprisingly, Spain maintained that the provisions of the Argentina-Spain BIT were 
controlling and prevented ICSID from exercising jurisdiction over the claim.148 In particular, 
Spain objected to Maffezini’s expansive interpretation of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain 
BIT.149 It maintained that “under the principle ejusdem generis the most favored nation clause 
can only operate in respect of the same matter and cannot be extended to matters different from 
those envisaged by the basic treaty.”150 According to Spain, this principle limited the scope of 
the MFN clause to substantive matters of treatment granted to investors and not to procedural or 
jurisdictional questions.151 In addition, Spain argued that the discrimination that MFN clauses 
 
146 Barry Appleton, MFN and International Investment Treaty Arbitration: Have we Lost Sight of 
the Forest Through the Trees?, 1 APPLETON’S INT’L INVESTMENT L. & ARB. NEWS, Feb. 2005, at 
10, 12.  The MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT is found in Article IV.2 and reads as 
follows: “In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than 
that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third 
country.”  Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶38.  Commentators have noted that the MFN 
clause in the Argentina-Chile BIT is a broad one: “It is worthy of note that the subject matter of 
the MFN provision at issue in the Maffezini case was particularly wide, covering as it did ‘all 
matters’ subject to the Argentina-Spain BIT.”  Fietta, supra note 137, at 133.   
 
147 Maffezini relied specifically on Article X.2 of the Chile-Spain BIT.  Maffezini, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/7 ¶39. 
 
148 See id. ¶19. 
 
149 See id. ¶41. 
 
150 Id. ¶41. 
 
151 See id. ¶41. 
 
32
were intended to protect against could only “take place in connection with material economic 
treatment and not with regard to procedural matters.”152 
Ultimately, the tribunal agreed with Maffezini.153 Consequently, it granted itself 
jurisdiction over the dispute.154 Relying in part on the Ambatielos case, the Tribunal found that 
the MFN clause could extend to procedural matters including the provisions for dispute 
resolution.155 In the Ambatielos case, the Commission of Arbitration determined that the MFN 
clause at issue could, in conformity with the ejusdem generis principle, extend to matters 
concerning the “administration of justice.”156 Similarly, the Maffezini Tribunal concluded that 
dispute resolution provisions are “inextricably related” to the substantive rights granted under the 
BIT.157 In effect, the Tribunal asserted that if the goal of a BIT is to protect investors from the 
 
152 Id. ¶42. 
 
153 See id. at ¶64.  “In light of the above considerations, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant 
has convincingly demonstrated that the most favored nation clause included in the Argentine-
Spain BIT embraces the dispute settlement provisions of this treaty.”  Id. Not surprisingly, this 
decision caused immediate controversy.  Appleton, supra note 146, at 13.   
 
154 Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶99. 
 
155 Id. ¶¶99; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 135, 
at 13.   
 
156 Id. ¶¶49-50; Fietta, supra note 137, at 133.  The Commission of Arbitrators conceded that 
when viewed in isolation, dispute resolution procedures are a different subject matter than the 
substantive rights.  Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶49. The situation changes, however, 
when the dispute resolution provision is viewed in connection with protecting rights generally.  
Id. 
157 Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶54.  “Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty 
containing the clause does not refer expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most 
favored nation clause, the Tribunal considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today 
dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as 
they are also related to the protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce.”  Id. 
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arbitrary and discriminatory practices of host states, “it would be illogical to exclude from the 
scope of such protection the field of procedural justice.”158 
The Tribunal found further support for its decision by examining the practice of both 
Argentina and Spain with respect to their BITs with other countries.159 Although at the time of 
the negotiation of the BIT at issue Argentina still sought to require some form of prior 
exhaustion of remedies, the Tribunal noted that Argentina had since abandoned that policy in 
favor of providing for direct submission of disputes to arbitration.160 The Tribunal also noted 
that Spain’s preferred practice was to allow for arbitration after a six-month negotiation 
period.161 Because the Chile-Spain BIT also provided for a six-month negotiation period, the 
Tribunal suggested that “there were no public policy considerations that would be contravened 
by allowing the claimant to submit the dispute to arbitration without previously submitting it to 
the local courts.”162 
Perhaps realizing the potential reach of its decision, the Tribunal attempted to set 
“important limits” to the extension of an MFN clause in the dispute resolution context.163 In 
particular, it noted that an investor should not be able to use an MFN clause to override public 
 
158 KATJA SCHOLZ, HAVING YOUR PIE…AND EATING IT WITH ONE CHOPSTICK – MOST 
FAVOURED NATION CLAUSES AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 3 (2004), available at 
http://www2.jura.uni-halle.de/telc/PolicyPaper5.pdf.  
 
159 Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶¶57-60. 
 
160 Id. ¶57. 
 
161 Id. ¶58. 
 
162 Stephen D. Sutton, Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain and the ICSID Secretaty-
General’s Screening Power, 21 ARB. INT’L 113, 120 (2005). 
 
163 Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶¶56, 62. 
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policy considerations that might have been considered fundamental conditions to agreement by 
the contracting states.164 The Tribunal then identified four situations where its general rule 
regarding MFN clauses might not apply.165 Finally, the Tribunal asserted that “a distinction has 
to be made between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means of the operation of 
the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would play havoc with the policy 
objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other.”166 
2. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic 
In August 1996, the Argentine Republic (Argentina) began soliciting bids for the 
development of a system of migration control and personal identification.167 Siemens’s 
Argentine affiliate won the bid and signed a contract with Argentina on October 6, 1998.168 
164 Id. ¶62. 
 
165 Id. ¶63.  The Tribunal set forth the following list of exceptions to the operation of an MFN 
clause: “i) The local remedies rule because it is a ‘fundamental rule of international law.’  ii) The 
fork in the road rule because otherwise it ‘would upset the finality of arrangements that many 
countries deem important as a matter of public policy.’  iii) Provision for a particular arbitration 
forum, such as ICSID. . . . iv) ‘A highly institutionalized system of arbitration that incorporates 
precise rules of procedure,’ such as in the NAFTA because ‘these very specific provisions reflect 
the precise will of the contracting parties.’”  Appleton, supra note 146, at 14 (quoting Maffezini,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶63).  Interestingly, the Tribunal failed to provide any authority for 
the limitation to the scope of the MFN clauses.  Id. (noting that “at least on commentator has 
accepted that the limitation was ‘invented’”).  
 
166 Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 ¶63.  These exceptions to the extension of an MFN 
clause appear problematic.  As one commentator noted, “It seems incongruous to conclude that 
such provisions are so fundamentally important to the host state that they should never be 
avoided through the operation of an MFN clause if the state has voluntarily excluded them in 
another treaty.”  Appleton, supra note 146, at 14. 
 
167 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Aug. 3, 2004, at ¶23, available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/Siemens_Argentina.pdf. 
 
168 Id. ¶25. 
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After a change in government in 1999, the contract was suspended.169 Fewer than two years 
later, Argentina terminated the contract.170 On May 23, 2002, ICSID received Siemens’s request 
for arbitration against the Argentine Republic.171 
In the request for arbitration, Siemens relied on the provisions of the Argentina-German 
BIT.172 Just as in Maffezini, this was insufficient to establish ICSID jurisdiction because the BIT 
required that an investor allow the domestic courts of the host state eighteen months to process 
the claim before being allowed to submit it to international arbitration.173 In order to avoid the 
delay and expense of litigating in Argentina, Siemens asserted that the MFN clause in the 
Argentina-Germany BIT allowed it to receive the more favorable treatment available in the 
Argentina-Chile BIT.174 This treatment permitted an investor to avoid first submitting a claim to 
the local courts before initiating arbitration.175 
In challenging ICSID’s jurisdiction over the dispute, Argentina first argued that reliance 
on Maffezini was inappropriate because it had involved the significantly broader MFN clause of 
 
169 Id. ¶26.  The contract was allegedly suspended because of technical problems.  Id. 
 
170 Id. ¶26.
171 Id. ¶1. 
 
172 Id. ¶27.  Siemens is a corporation based in the Federal Republic of Germany.  Siemens A.G., 
About Us, 
http://www.siemens.com/index.jsp?sdc_p=cfi1327885lmo1327903ps7t6uz1&sdc_bcpath=13278
85.s_0,&sdc_sid=3800911433 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).   
 
173 Appleton, supra note 146, at 20. 
 
174 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶32. 
 
175 Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Upholds Jurisdiction in Siemens v. Argentina; MFN Plays 
Procedural Role, INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y WKLY. NEWS BULL., Aug. 23, 2004, available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_investsd_aug23_2004.pdf.  
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the Argentina-Spain BIT.176 Argentina also argued that the “relevant dispute resolution 
provisions of the Argentina-Germany BIT had been specifically negotiated and must not 
therefore be subject to amendment by virtue of the MFN clause.”177 Moreover, Argentina 
suggested that when parties intended the scope of an MFN clause to encompass the dispute 
resolution system, they stated so expressly.178 Later, Argentina asserted that limitations to state 
sovereignty should be interpreted restrictively.179 Argentina further argued that Siemens’s 
interpretation of the scope of the MFN clause would deprive the dispute resolution provision in 
the Argentina-Germany BIT of any meaning – a result incompatible with generally accepted 
principles of treaty interpretation.180 
Argentina’s final argument was perhaps the most inspired.  It maintained that if Siemens 
was “entitled to use the MFN clause to import advantageous aspects of the dispute resolution 
 
176 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶34.  As one commentator noted, “the MFN 
provisions contained within the Argentina-Germany BIT were seemingly not as wide as the 
provision in issue in the Maffezini case.”  Fietta, supra note 137, at 134.  Article III of the 
Argentina-Germany BIT contains the following MFN clause: “(1) None of the Contracting 
Parties shall accord in its territory to the investments of nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party or to investments in which they hold shares, a less favourable treatment than 
the treatment granted to the investments of its own nationals or companies or to the investments 
of nationals or companies of third States.  (2) None of the Contracting Parties shall accord in its 
territory to nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party a less favourable treatment of 
activities related to investments than granted to its own nationals and companies or to the 
nationals of third States.”  Appleton, supra note 146, at 20. 
 
177 Fietta, supra note 137, at 134; see Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶¶48-50. 
 
178 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶48.  In support of this position, Argentina referred 
to several examples of countries specifically addressing whether MFN clauses should extend to 
affect dispute resolution provisions.  See id. 
179 See id. ¶51. 
 
180 See id. ¶59.  In particular, Argentina suggested that depriving the provision of any meaning 
would fall afoul of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Id. 
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provisions of the Argentina-Chile BIT, then it should also be required to import the 
disadvantageous aspects of those provisions.”181 That is, one cannot pick and choose 
advantageous BIT clauses, but must instead take the BIT as a whole.  In this case, importing the 
disadvantageous provisions of the Argentina-Chile BIT might have precluded Siemens’s 
claim.182 Failure to do so, Argentina asserted, would offer Siemens treatment more favorable 
than that available to Chilean investors under their BIT.183 Therefore, Argentina bluntly stated 
that MFN clauses “do not serve to create a super investment treaty that includes the main 
benefits of each different treaty.”184 
Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with Siemens.185 Consequently, it granted itself 
jurisdiction over the dispute.186 To begin, the Tribunal found interpretive guidance in the BIT’s 
object and purpose – “to create favorable conditions for investments and to stimulate private 
initiative.”187 In response to Argentina’s contention that reliance on Maffezini was inappropriate, 
 
181 Fietta, supra note 137, at 134; see Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶124. 
 
182 The Argentina-Chile BIT might have excluded the type of indirect claim that Siemens was 
bringing against Argentina.  See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶124. Because Siemens 
had acted through a wholly-owned affiliate in Argentina, its claim could have been considered 
indirect for the purposes of the Argentina-Chile BIT.  See id. ¶¶23, 123.  The Argentina-
Germany BIT, on the other hand, allowed indirect claims against the host country. 
 
183 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶124.  Argentina claimed that providing this more 
favorable treatment was contrary to the operation of the MFN clause.  Id. 
 
184 Id. To do so would frustrate the reasonable expectations of the parties when they drafted their 
BIT.  Moreover, if would provide economically weaker countries with benefits disproportionate 
to their bargaining power; thereby, giving weaker states a windfall. 
 
185 See id. ¶184. 
 
186 Id. 
 
187 Id. ¶81.  The Tribunal notes that this approach is appropriate in light of Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Id. That article requires that a treaty “be interpreted 
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the Tribunal noted the difference between the MFN clauses involved but still accepted Siemens’s 
position.188 It did so on the basis that access to certain dispute resolution procedures was 
considered a distinctive feature of the Argentina-Germany BIT.189 In fact, the status of the 
dispute resolution provisions indicated that they were considered part of the protections offered 
by the treaty.190 As a result, access to such provisions was considered part of the “treatment” 
that the MFN clause guaranteed to investors.191 Moreover, the Tribunal noted that the use of the 
term “treatment” in the clause was so general that it was inappropriate to limit the application of 
the MFN clause except where specifically agreed by the parties.192 Finding no specific 
exceptions, the Tribunal decided that the MFN clause would apply to dispute resolution 
provisions.193 Having defined the scope of the MFN clause, the Tribunal addressed Argentina’s 
argument regarding importing both advantageous and disadvantageous provisions of a treaty 
when relying on such a clause.  Despite recognizing that “the disadvantages may have been a 
 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”  Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340). 
 
188 See id. ¶103. 
 
189 See Fietta, supra note 137, at 134; Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶102. 
 
190 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶102. 
 
191 See id. Both provisions in Article III of the Argentina-Germany BIT required that investors 
receive “treatment” no less favorable than that extended to nationals or companies of third states.  
See supra note 176. 
 
192 Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 ¶106. 
 
193 See id. 
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trade-off for claimed advantages,” the Tribunal asserted that, as the name indicates, MFN clauses 
relate only to “more favorable treatment.”194 
D. Narrow Interpretations 
 In both cases in this section, investors relying on the Maffezini decision claimed rights 
provided for in a BIT other than the one that governed their dispute.  Arguing that MFN clauses 
should be interpreted broadly, the investors asserted that they were entitled to select specific 
rights equivalent to those most advantageous to the investors’ aims provided in other BITs.  In 
particular, the investors argued that fulfilling the purpose of the BIT at issue required 
interpreting the MFN clause so as to encompass dispute resolution provisions because they were 
essential to the protection that the BIT intended to provide.  In both cases, the arbitral tribunals 
interpreted the scope of the MFN clauses narrowly. 
1. Salini Constutorri S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan 
In 1992, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) requested bids for a public works 
contract called “Construction of the Karameh Dam Project.”195 Two Italian companies, Salini 
Costruttori S.p.A. (Salini) and Italstrade S.p.A. (Italstrade), jointly submitted an offer in May 
 
194 Id. ¶120.  The Tribunal also noted that it concurred with Maffezini that MFN clauses could 
not be used to override certain public policy considerations that the contracting parties had 
thought essential to agreement.  See id. ¶109.  Taking the analysis one step further, the Tribunal 
stated that it would view a requirement essential to the agreement if it had been consistently 
included in other treaties made by the host country.  See id. ¶105.  At least one commentator has 
noted two problems with this approach.  See Appleton, supra note 146, at 21.  First, looking to 
other treaties for consistent practice seems inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties which fails to list such treaties as relevant to assist in interpreting treaties.  Id.  
Second, the Tribunal fails to address why a provision might be left out of a treaty if it 
represented an important public policy.  Id. 
195 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICISD Case 
No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, Nov. 29, 2004, ¶14, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/salini-decision.pdf. 
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1993 and were awarded the contract on November 4, 1993.196 Having completed the work in 
October 1997, Salini and Italstrade submitted a final statement setting forth the amount owed 
them.197 Following Jordan’s refusal to pay, Salini and Italstrade filed a request for arbitration 
that ICSID received on August 12, 2002.198 
In the request for arbitration, Salini and Italstrade relied on the provisions of the Italy-
Jordan BIT.199 Reliance on the BIT, however, may have required Salini and Italstrade to resort 
to the less favorable dispute resolution provisions of the contract.200 In an attempt to avoid these 
less favorable provisions, Salini and Italstrade invoked the MFN clause in the Italy-Jordan 
BIT.201 In effect, Salini and Italstrade asserted that the MFN clause should apply to procedural 
rights as decided in Maffezini.202 The result of such an application was to grant the investors 
 
196 Id. The two companies acted as a joint venture for the purposes of the contract with Jordan.  
Id. 
 
197 See id. ¶15.  Salini and Italstrade claimed an amount equivalent to approximately $28 million.  
Id. 
 
198 See id. ¶¶17, 1.  On September 12, 2000, Salini and Italstrade received a letter from Jordan’s 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation that stated Jordan’s refusal to pay a 
sum in excess $49,140.  Id. ¶17, 15.  This sum was the amount that Jordan’s Engineer calculated 
as necessary to pay the contractors.  See id. ¶15. 
 
199 See id. ¶17. 
 
200 Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT contained the following provision: “In case the investor 
and an entity of the Contracting Parties have stipulated an investment Agreement, the procedure 
foreseen in such investment Agreement shall apply.”  Id. ¶66. 
 
201 See id. ¶21.  Article 3 of the Italy-Jordan BIT contains the following MFN provisions: “1. 
Both Contracting Parties, within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant investments 
effected by, and the income accruing to, investors of the other Contracting Party, no less 
favourable treatment than that accorded to investments effected by, and income accruing to, its 
own nationals or investors of Third States.”  Id. ¶104. 
 
202 See id. ¶¶36, 102. 
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access to the more favorable dispute resolution provisions of the Jordan-USA BIT and the 
Jordan-UK BIT.203 Under those BITs, investors are “entitled to refer to ICSID any dispute 
arising from their construction contracts.”204 
In response to the MFN argument, Jordan asserted that the clause could not apply to 
procedural obligations.205 Jordan further maintained that the clause could not override the clear 
intent of the parties.206 Moreover, Jordan noted that the Maffezini decision could not bind the 
Tribunal and should not be followed.207 
Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with Jordan.208 Consequently, it dismissed the claim for 
lack of jurisdiction.209 Before announcing its decision, the Tribunal “observed that some MFN 
clauses, such as those contained in many [United Kingdom] BITs, provide expressly that they 
extend to dispute resolution issues, whereas others, such as the clause in Maffezini, contain broad 
 
203 See id. ¶102.  Article IX of the Jordan-USA BIT gives investors “the right to submit 
investment disputes with the host State to ICSID regardless of any clause in the investment 
agreement providing for a different dispute settlement mechanism.”  Id. ¶21. 
 
204 Id. ¶102. 
 
205 See id. ¶103. 
 
206 See id. The clear intent of the parties was expressed in Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT.  
Id. Jordan further asserted that “‘even assuming that the most-favoured-nation clause could, in 
theory, apply to dispute settlement provisions, it is subject to overriding public policy 
considerations’ recognized by the ICSID Tribunal itself in the Maffezini case.”  Id. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. ¶119.  “[T]he Tribunal concludes that Article 3 of the BIT does not apply insofar as 
dispute settlement clauses are concerned. . . . In the event that, as in this case, the dispute is 
between a foreign investor and an entity of the Jordanian State, the contractual disputes between 
them must, in accordance with Article 9(2), be settled under the procedure set forth in the 
investment agreement.”  Id. 
 
209 Id. 
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language referring to ‘all matters’ subject to the agreement.”210 The Tribunal then proceeded to 
highlight four factors supporting its decision.211 First, the Italy-Jordan BIT did not expressly 
provide that the MFN clause would apply to dispute resolution.212 Second, the wording of the 
MFN clause at issue was significantly narrower than that in Maffezini.213 Third, there was no 
indication that the parties intended the clause to apply to dispute resolution issues.214 In fact, the 
Tribunal noted that Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT demonstrated the parties’ express 
intention that very specific dispute resolution provisions should apply to investors covered by the 
BIT.215 Fourth, the Tribunal noted that Salini and Italstrade had failed to provide evidence of 
any Jordanian or Italian practice that would support their claim.216 
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal sought to distinguish Maffezini rather than reject 
it.217 It did so by suggesting that the Maffezini decision, like the Ambatielos decision, was 
 
210 Fietta, supra note 137, at 135. 
 
211 See Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 ¶118. 
 
212 See id.  “Indeed, Article 3 of the BIT between Italy and Jordan does not include any provision 
extending its scope of application to dispute settlement.”  Id. 
213 See id. “[The BIT] does not envisage ‘all rights or all matters covered by the agreement.’”  
Id. 
214 See id. “[T]he Claimants have submitted nothing from which it might be established that the 
common intention of the Parties was to have the most-favored-nation clause apply to dispute 
settlement.”  Id. 
 
215 See id. “[T]he intention as expressed in Article 9(2) of the BIT was to exclude from ICSID 
jurisdiction contractual disputes between an investor and an entity of a State Party in order that 
such disputes might be settled in accordance with the procedures set forth in the investment 
agreements.”  Id. 
216 See id. “[T]he Claimants have not cited any practice in Jordan or Italy in support of their 
claims.”  Id. 
 
217 See Fietta, supra note 137, at 135. 
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justifiable because of the broad wording of the MFN clause.218 It is important to note, however, 
that the Maffezini Tribunal did not base its decision on the breadth of the MFN clause in the 
Argentina-Spain BIT.219 Instead, it asserted that “there are good reasons to conclude that today 
dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors.”220 
This language implies that the Maffezini Tribunal might have been more sympathetic to Salini 
and Italstrade’s claim for protection under the more favorable dispute resolution provisions of 
other Jordanian BITs.  Following closer examination, it seems that Salini marked “a decisive 
step away from the expansive approach that had been adopted in Maffezini and back towards 
application of basic principles of international law to the facts of each individual case.”221 
Although the Salini Tribunal did not have the opportunity to comment on the case, 
commentators suggest that it would have rejected the rationale behind the Siemens decision.222 
In particular, it seems likely that the Salini Tribunal would have rejected an expansive 
interpretation because of the more restrictive language of the MFN clause in the Argentina-
Germany BIT. 
 2. Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria 
218 See Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 ¶117. 
 
219 See Appleton, supra note 146, at 22. 
220 See id. (quoting Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Jan. 25, 2000, ¶1); supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
 
221 Fietta, supra note 137, at 136. 
 
222 See id. (“Indeed, it is difficult to envisage the tribunal being able to support [the Siemens]
decision, given that none of the distinguishing features of Maffezini applied in that case.”); 
Appleton, supra note 146, at 22 (“The Salini v. Jordan decision is difficult to reconcile with that 
in Siemens v. Argentina.”). 
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 In 1998, a Cypriot company, which eventually became Plama Consortium Limited 
(Plama), purchased an equity interest in a Bulgarian company that owned an oil refinery.223 
Plama later claimed that the Republic of Bulgaria (Bulgaria) deliberately interfered with the 
operation of the refinery in such a way as to cause material damage to the investment.224 In 
response to this interference, Plama, by a letter of December 24, 2002, filed a request for 
arbitration with ICSID.225 
In the request for arbitration, Plama relied on the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)226 and the 
Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT.227 Although the ICSID Tribunal eventually found jurisdiction under the 
ECT, this comment is concerned with the Tribunal’s decision regarding the BIT claim.228 
Notwithstanding Plama’s reliance, the express provisions of the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT were 
insufficient to establish ICSID jurisdiction.229 In fact, the BIT containted a very narrow 
 
223 See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Feb. 8, 2005, ¶19; Appleton & Associates International Lawyers, Plama 
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, 1 APPLETON’S INT’L INVESTMENT L. & ARB. NEWS,
Mar. 2005, at 11. 
 
224 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶21; Appleton & Associates International Lawyers, 
supra note 223, at 11; Judicial and Related Documents: International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Plama Consortium Limited v. The Republic of Bulgaria,
Decision on Jurisdiction (February 8, 2005), INT’L L. IN BRIEF (The American Society of 
International Law), Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.asil.org/ilib/2005/02/ilib050228.htm.   
 
225 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶1. 
 
226 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100. 
 
227 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶1; Fietta, supra note 137, at 136. 
 
228 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶240 (“Under Article 26 ECT and the ICSID 
Convention, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on the merits the Claimant’s claims against 
the Respondent for alleged breaches of Part III of the ECT.”); Appleton & Associates 
International Lawyers, supra note 223, at 11. 
 
229 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶26. 
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arbitration clause that permitted ad hoc arbitration230 only in cases involving the amount of 
compensation owed to foreign investors affected by expropriation.231 To avoid the dispute 
resolution provisions of the governing BIT, Plama asserted that the BIT’s MFN clause provided 
a means of incorporating the more favorable provisions of other Bulgarian BITs.232 
In response to Plama’s MFN clause interpretation, Bulgaria made three basic 
arguments.233 First, it maintained that in the absence of evidence to the contrary an MFN clause 
cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction where it would not exist under the governing BIT.234 
Second, it asserted that dispute resolution did not fall within the scope of the MFN clause in the 
 
230 “Ad hoc arbitrations are not conducted under the auspices or supervision of an arbitral 
institution.  Instead, parties simply agree to arbitrate, without designating any institution to 
administer their arbitration.”  GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 12 (2d ed. 2001). 
 
231 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶26; Fietta, supra note 137, at 136; Judicial and 
Related Documents, supra note 224; Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Finds Jurisdiction Under 
Energy Charter, but Reigns in MFN Shopping, INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y WKLY. NEWS BULL., 
Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_investsd_mar10_2005.pdf.  
In addition to allowing international arbitration only for expropriation issues, Article 4 of the 
Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT specified that the arbitration procedure was determined by the UNICTRAL 
Arbitration Rules.  See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶26. 
 
232 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶183.  “The mechanism for arriving at that 
conclusion is, according to the Claimant, the following: (a) the Claimant qualifies as an investor 
under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT; (b) the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT contains an MFN provision; (c) the 
MFN provision in the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT applies to all aspects of “treatment;” and (d) 
“treatment” covers settlement of disputes provisions in other BITs to which Bulgaria is a 
Contracting Party.  In that connection, the Claimant relies, inter alia, on the Bulgaria-Finland 
BIT.”  Id. The MFN clause in Article 3 of the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT includes the following 
language: “1. Each Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its territory by investors of 
the other Contracting Party a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to 
investments by investors of third states.”  Id. ¶26. 
 
233 Id. ¶37. 
 
234 Id. 
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Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT.235 Third, it stated that Plama could not override the clear policy 
considerations expressed in the BIT by invoking the MFN clause.236 
Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with Bulgaria regarding the proper scope of the MFN 
clause.237 In rejecting an expansive interpretation of the clause, the Tribunal first addressed the 
Maffezini decision.238 In particular, it asserted that the Maffezini Tribunal’s declaration that 
“dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to protection of foreign investors,” was 
legally insufficient to demonstrate that the parties to the BIT intended the MFN clause to cover 
dispute resolution.239 The Tribunal then went on to discuss the negotiating history between the 
parties.240 Following the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria, the parties tried and 
failed to revise the dispute resolution provisions in the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT.241 The Tribunal 
inferred from these negotiations that the parties did not consider that the MFN clause would 
extend to dispute settlement.242 As the Tribunal noted, “Doubts as to the parties’ clear and 
unambiguous intention can arise if the agreement to arbitrate is to be reached by incorporation 
 
235 Id. 
 
236 Id. 
 
237 Id. ¶184. 
 
238 See id. ¶193. 
 
239 Id. 
 
240 See id. ¶195. 
 
241 See id. 
242 See id. If Cyprus and Bulgaria believed that the MFN clause would extend to dispute 
settlement provisions, further negotiation would have been unnecessary and unhelpful. 
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by reference.”243 Next, the Tribunal asserted that the fact that instruments like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)244 specifically excluded dispute resolution 
provisions from the scope of an MFN clause did not indicate that if such an exclusion was 
lacking, then dispute resolution provisions should be deemed incorporated.245 Instead, “the 
intention to incorporate dispute settlement provisions must be clearly and unambiguously 
expressed.”246 
Although the Tribunal stopped short of expressly rejecting the Maffezini decision, it 
proposed a drastically different approach to MFN clauses: rather than assuming that the MFN 
clause applied to dispute settlement provisions unless certain exceptions applied, the Tribunal 
asserted that such clauses should not apply to dispute settlement except where it was the clear 
intention of the parties.247 As at least one commentator noted, “This effectively reversed the 
statements of principle set out in the Maffezini decision,” which held that MFN clauses should 
243 Id. ¶199. 
 
244 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Jan. 1, 1994, 107 Stat. 2057. 
 
245 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶203 
 
246 Id. ¶204.  An example of such practice is found in the UK Model BIT.  See id.  Article 3(3) of 
the Model BIT expressly includes dispute settlement within the scope of the MFN clause.  See id. 
 
247 A recent jurisdiction hearing before an ICSID tribunal affirmed the Maffezini approach by 
ruling that “[u]nless it appears clearly that the state parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular 
investment agreement settled on a different method for dispute resolution of disputes that may 
arise, most-favored-nation provisions in BITs should be understood to be applicable to dispute 
settlement.”  Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal OKs Treaty-Shopping for Better Arbitration Options 
in Gas Natural Case, INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y NEWS BULL., July 13, 2005 (quoting Gas Natural 
SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Preliminary Questions of Jurisdiction, June 17, 2005, 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf), 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2427.  
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apply to dispute settlement in the absence of the clear intention of the parties.248 The Tribunal 
further tipped its hand by commenting that the Siemens decision “illustrates the danger caused by 
the manner in which the Maffezini decision has approached the question.”249 
V. THE PROBLEM WITH UNCERTAINTY 
Given that the number of arbitrations involving investment treaties has exploded over the 
last five years, the existence of some inconsistent decisions is understandable.250 Unfortunately, 
the increasing number of inconsistencies has caused concern about whether the current ad hoc 
system of international arbitrations is appropriate for resolving treaty disputes.251 Although 
international arbitration has largely replaced domestic courts in settling investment disputes, it 
lacks some of the more familiar and important aspects of a classic judicial system.252 
Specifically, international arbitration decisions often lack the finality and comparative 
uniformity of traditional court rulings.253 
248 Fietta, supra note 137, at 137.  Fietta further notes that “had the tribunal agreed with the 
general approach taken in the Maffezini case, it could have rejected the claimant’s arguments on 
the basis of one of the public policy-related exceptions to the general rule identified in that case.  
Instead, it went much further by reversing the general rule.”  Id. 
 
249 See Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 ¶226; Fietta, supra note 137, at 137. 
 
250 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1521.  “A single act or measure of a host State may adversely 
affect more than one investor.  The investors, in turn, may each submit the resulting disputes to 
arbitration under the terms of an investment treaty of the State that covers the investors.  There 
may as a result be as many arbitration proceedings as affected investors.  The scope for 
inconsistent decisions in regard to essentially the same situation is obvious.”  Antonio R. Parra, 
Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Law, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 287, 352 (1997). 
 
251 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1582. 
 
252 See Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9. 
 
253 See id. 
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Not surprisingly, the ICSID arbitration system shares these shortcomings.  As the four 
cases addressed here demonstrate, ICSID arbitral tribunals do not present a unified approach to 
deciding the appropriate effect of MFN clauses on dispute settlement provisions.254 This type of 
inconsistency causes two problems worthy of further attention.   
First, inconsistent ICSID tribunal decisions regarding essentially the same issue may 
foster a loss of legitimacy.255 One of the primary elements of legitimacy is coherence.256 
Coherence “requires consistency of interpretation and application of rules in order to promote 
perceptions of fairness and justice.”257 Unfortunately, the different approaches to and 
interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses adopted by ICSID tribunals demonstrate a marked 
lack of coherence.  Not surprisingly, this lack of coherence threatens to raise “the specter of a 
legitimacy crisis.”258 
Second, inconsistent ICSID tribunal decisions foster a loss of certainty.  Without 
question, different approaches and interpretations will result in a lack of certainty regarding the 
meaning and application of MFN clauses.  This, in turn, will result in confusion regarding both 
 
254 See supra notes 141-249 and accompanying text. 
 
255 It is not hard to believe that “‘any system where diametrically opposed decisions can legally 
coexist cannot last long.’”  Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, AM.
LAW./FOCUS EUR., Summer 2004 (quoting Nigel Blackaby of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt04.html.  In discussing the status 
of international arbitration generally, Charles Brower has suggested that inconsistent decisions 
and the shortcomings of arbitration systems are causing a growing crisis of legitimacy.  See 
Brower, supra note 252. 
 
256 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1585. 
 
257 Id. Although “[e]stablishing such a coherent jurisprudence is difficult . . . with new and 
relatively untested standards,” the need for it is clear.  Id. 
258 Id. at 1586. 
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investor rights and host-state obligations regarding dispute settlement.  Ultimately, this type of 
confusion frustrates one of the primary objectives behind the BIT movement – eliminating 
uncertainty regarding the substantive and procedural aspects of investment protection.259 
Although the effects of the loss of both legitimacy and certainty in the ICSID regime are 
speculative at this point, they bear mentioning.  Perhaps the most likely effect of the loss of 
legitimacy is an increased number of challenges to ICSID tribunal decisions.  Whether this 
occurs through ICSID mechanisms or through a host state’s domestic courts when an investor 
attempts to collect an award, it will challenge belief in ICSID’s utility.260 Another potential, 
although less likely, effect is an exodus of states from the ICSID Convention.  If the enforcement 
mechanism of the Convention no longer enjoys legitimacy or fails to provide certainty, it is 
reasonable to suspect that some states might withdraw consent to ICSID arbitration. 
VI.  APPROACHES TO LIMITING THE EFFECT OF INCONSISTENT MFN CLAUSE 
DECISIONS 
 
Although there are several potential approaches to limiting the negative effects of 
inconsistent MFN clause decisions by ICSID tribunals, some are more practical than others.  The 
purpose of this section is to highlight a number of solutions and address the feasibility of each. 
 
259 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 76.  “The lack of consensus on the customary 
international law applicable to foreign investments also created uncertainty in the minds of 
investors as to the degree of protection they could expect under international law.  To gain 
greater certainty and to counter the threat of adverse national law and regulation, the host 
countries of these investors sought to conclude a series of BITs that would provide clear rules 
and effective enforcement mechanisms, at least with regard to their treaty partners.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
260 Facing a potential deluge of adverse ICSID judgments following its economic crisis of early 
2002, “Argentina executive branch authorities have already indicated to the press that any 
attempt to enforce an ICSID award within Argentina will likely be challenged on constitutional 
grounds in Argentine courts.”  Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against 
Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 41, 73 (2004). 
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 A. Impractical Approaches 
 1. Annulment of inconsistent decisions 
One of the purposes of international investment arbitration is to “‘keep dispute resolution 
out of the courts of one of the parties and protect litigants from the costs of plodding through the 
long corridors of national judicial bureaucracies.’”261 Accordingly, the ICSID Convention 
provides a self-contained control mechanism which prevents domestic courts from reviewing 
ICSID tribunal decisions.262 Article 52 of the ICSID Convention contains this mechanism and 
allows for annulment of awards in only a very limited number of circumstances.263 Here, it is 
important to note that an annulment proceeding does not allow review of the legal merits of a 
decision.264 Rather, it provides for an ad hoc committee of three arbitrators appointed by ICSID 
to examine the procedural propriety of the award.265 In the event that the committee finds one of 
the enumerated defects, it may annul the award completely or in part.266 
261 Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 41-42 (2001) (quoting Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the 
Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 743). 
 
262 See id. at 42; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 889 
(2001) (noting that “domestic courts have not power of review over ICSID awards). 
 
263 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 52(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S 192.  Annulment of an award is permitted on one or more of the 
following grounds: “(a) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) the Tribunal has 
manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; 
(d) there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) the award has 
failed to state the reasons on which it is based.”  See id. 
 
264 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1547. 
265 See id.; International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 52(3), Mar. 
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S 192.   
266 Franck, supra note 2, at 1547. 
 
52
 Ultimately, although the annulment mechanism is a useful aspect of the protection 
offered by ICSID, it lacks the ability to review inconsistent decisions for errors of substantive 
law.267 Consequently, it is inappropriate as a forum for resolving the inconsistency regarding 
whether MFN clauses should encompass dispute resolution provisions.268 
2. Amending the ICSID Convention 
Another potential approach to limiting the effect of the inconsistent MFN clause 
decisions is to amend the ICSID Convention.  Although it is unclear how such an amendment 
might look, it seems that careful drafting would create a provision that either expressly endorsed 
or rejected the application of MFN clauses to dispute resolution provisions in the absence of an 
expression by the parties.269 Despite the relatively straightforward nature of this solution, the 
amendment provisions of the ICSID Convention make it impractical.270 According to Article 
66(1), “each amendment shall enter into force 30 days after . . . all Contracting States have 
ratified, accepted or approved the amendment.”271 Considering that the number of Contracting 
 
267 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 
268 Further evidence of the inability of the annulment mechanism to address inconsistent 
decisions is the fact that even if the committee found a reason to annul an inconsistent decision, a 
new decision on the merits of the case is available only after the claim is submitted to a new 
tribunal.  See Nmehielle, supra note 6, at 43.  Considering that there is no guarantee that a new 
tribunal would rule differently or act to harmonize inconsistent decisions, the annulment 
mechanism proves unhelpful in this context.  In fact, one commentator noted that “because legal 
errors cannot be corrected in ICSID awards, the possibility of inconsistent awards is an accepted 
reality at ICSID, and the correctness of decisions has been sacrificed for the sake of finality.”  
Franck, supra note 2, at 1548. 
 
269 For example: Unless otherwise expressly agreed by the parties, no MFN clause shall apply to 
the express dispute settlement provisions contained in their bilateral investment treaty. 
 
270 See Sedlak, supra note 7, at 157. 
 
271 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 66(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1295, 575 U.N.T.S 200. 
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States is approaching 150, this process appears prohibitively unwieldy.272 Moreover, as the 
number of Contracting States continues to grow, the chance of a successful amendment 
continues to shrink.273 
3. Creating an appellate system 
 Although several suggestions for creating an appellate system exist, one stands out.274 
The creation of an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court appears uniquely suited to 
successfully addressing the inconsistent decisions of arbitral tribunals.  Among its attractions is 
the fact that “a single, unified, permanent body charged with developing international law and 
creating consistent jurisprudence will promote legitimacy more than disaggregated arbitrations 
that come to different conclusions on the same issue.”275 The ultimate effect of such an appellate 
body would be the harmonization of decisions regarding disputed legal interpretations.276 
Despite the potential utility of an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court, its creation 
seems unlikely.  Although it would not require the unanimous consent of all parties to the ICSID 
Convention, creating such an appellate court would require a significant number of signatories.  
 
272 See ICSID, List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-
en.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); Sedlak, supra note 7, at 157 (noting that “logistically [the 
amendment] process becomes unwieldy to the point of being impractical”).  In fact, as of 2001, 
no amendment proposal had even been made.  SCHREUER, supra note 260, at 1265. 
 
273 See Sedlak, supra note 7, at 157. 
 
274 See Franck, supra note 2, at 1606-1610, 1617-1625. 
275 See id. at 1617. 
 
276 See id. at 1619-20.  Considering the remarkable similarity of investment treaty provisions, 
this type of harmonization would go a long way toward granting investors and host countries 
certainty regarding their respective rights and obligations.  See id. See generally Susan D. 
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1548 (2005), for an extensive 
discussion of the utility and organization of an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court. 
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Failure on this point would prevent the court from achieving the sort of international credibility 
needed to meet its objective of unifying standards of investment treaty jurisprudence. 
 B. A Practical Approach 
 In contrast to other approaches that require the assent of a prohibitively large number of 
states, the legislative (better drafting) approach requires the assent of only two.277 In essence, the 
approach requires the parties to a BIT to expressly state the proper scope of the applicable MFN 
clause.  Whether the parties decide to expand the clause to encompass dispute settlement 
provisions is irrelevant.  In fact, evidence of both expansive and narrow interpretations already 
exists.  For example, the United Kingdom includes expansive language in its BITs,278 while the 
United States includes narrow language.279 
277 It is important to remember that the difficulties with creating multilateral investment treaties 
eventually led to the emergence of the bilateral negotiation of investment treaties.  Supra notes 
41-44 and accompanying text.  Similarly, here, the difficulties inherent in amending the ICSID 
Convention or in creating an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court seem to have already driven 
parties to reevaluate and retool their approach to BITs. 
 
278 Article 3(3) of the U.K. Model BIT, which is part of the MFN clause, contains the following 
language: “For avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 of this Agreement. [Articles 8 
and 9 of the UK Model BIT provide for dispute settlement].”  Fietta, supra note 137, at 136.   
 
279 Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the U.S. Model BIT, which contain the MFN clause, expressly 
provide that the clause applies only with “respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”  2004 United 
States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty arts. 4(1), (2) 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pd
f (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).  Noticeably absent from the list of things covered by the MFN 
clause is dispute settlement provisions.  Given its express language, it is clear that the United 
States intends to exclude such provisions from the scope of the MFN clause.  Further evidence of 
this U.S. preference is found in the draft text of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA).  In the draft, a footnote attached to the MFN clause in article 10.4 expressly excludes 
the expansion of the clause to issues involving dispute settlement.  The Dominican Republic – 
Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10.4, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DR_Final_Texts/asset_upload_file328_4718.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); see CAFTA: Effect 
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 In addition to resolving any ambiguity regarding the scope of MFN clauses in future 
treaties, the adoption of an express policy by one of the signatories may help resolve the issue for 
BITs that are already in force.280 Specifically, the adoption of a policy to define the scope of the 
MFN clause within the provisions of the BIT itself demonstrates a state’s public policy.  This, in 
turn, may prove sufficient to meet the public policy exception set forth in the Maffezini 
decision.281 As a result, when faced with a claim, a host state that opposes an expansive 
interpretation may credibly rely on its demonstrable expression of public policy.282 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Currently, international investment protection depends almost exclusively on a complex 
and growing web of BITs.  Although the treaties themselves provide for significant substantive 
and procedural protection, these rights are of questionable value without a neutral and well-
respected forum for dispute settlement.  Fortunately, such a forum exists in ICSID.  
Unfortunately, a series of conflicting decisions regarding the proper scope of MFN clauses 
threatens to cause a crisis of legitimacy and frustrate the BIT regime’s goal of providing 
 
on Investment Arbitrations, PUB. INT’L L. NEWS (Freshfileds Bruckhaus Deringer), Mar./Apr. 
2004, at 1, 2, http://www.freshfields.com/practice/pil/publications/pil_news/7996.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
 
280 This possibility is essential to the practicality of the legislative approach.  Without it, the 
approach would require renegotiating thousands of BITs in order to effectively remedy the 
prospect of inconsistent decisions.  Such a renegotiation is understandably impractical.  Franck, 
supra note 2, at 1589. 
 
281 See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
 
282 Although this position is far from failsafe, it seems credible enough to qualify as a public 
policy exception under both the Maffezini and Siemens decisions.  The best that can be said is 
that it is likely to work under Maffezini because an express policy is evidence of state practice.  
Moreover, it is likely to work under Siemens because it is also evidence of consistent state 
practice. 
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certainty for both host states and investors.  While much ink has been spilled attempting to 
outline an effective approach for resolving, or at least limiting the effect of, such inconsistent 
decisions, only one approach seems practical.  Like the BIT regime, the legislative approach to 
addressing the scope of MFN clauses relies primarily on bilateral negotiation and express 
agreement between the specific parties to the BIT.  Although some notable countries already 
employ this approach, it is hardly widespread.  Ultimately, with greater attention to the drafting 
of MFN clauses in BITs, host states and investors may continue to enjoy the level of certainty 
regarding rights and obligations that BITs and ICSID were created to provide, and the gunboats 
can remain in dry dock. 
